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THE DEATH OF A MAXIM: IGNORANCE OF
LAW IS NO EXCUSE (KILLED BY MONEY,
GUNS AND A LITTLE SEX)
"Ignorance of the Law excuses no man; not that all men
know the law, but because it's an excuse every man will
plead, and no man can tell how to refute him."1
MARK D. YoCHUM*
Ignorance of the law is no excuse 2 for crime except when the
statute that criminalizes the behavior allows ignorance as an ex-
cuse. 3 This maxim has played a fundamental role in the inter-
pretive process of criminal law, determining the meaning of
criminal statutes. 4 Another fundamental principle is the belief in
the legislature's rationality. That is, the legislature speaks ra-
tionally through its choices, and therefore, any ambiguity may be
construed as sensible. This notion colors all interpretive tech-
niques from grammar to legislative history. However, the actual
existence of the rational legislature is often belied by a history of
errors, ellipses, and oddities produced by these bodies. Recog-
nizing that the monolithic, legislative, rational writer is a myth,
it is nonetheless theoretically beneficial because of its salutary
I John Selden (1584-1654).
* Associate Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law. Georgetown Law
Center, J.D. 1977.
2 "Ignorance of the law is no excuse" is taken from the latin phrases ignorantia legis
neminem excusat or ignorantia juris non excusat.
3 For example the ancient crime of larceny has a legal knowledge mental state ele-
ment. If the actor actually believes the property taken is his, that legal error vitiates the
crimes. See State v. Quisenberry, 639 S.W.2d 579, 583 (Mo. 1982) (discussing defense of
claim of right to negative mental element of crime of larceny); State v. Guice, 262 N.J.
Super. 607, 615 (1993) (discussing statutory mistake of law defense); Commonwealth v.
Meinhart, 173 Pa. Super. 495, 498-99 (1953) (discussing statutory interpretation of crime
of larceny).
4 See People v. McLaughlin, 245 P.2d 1076, 1080 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952) (stating that
"no doctrine is more universal or of more ancient lineage in the law than ignorance of the
law excuses no one. That doctrine still strides the world."); People v. Marrero, 69 N.Y.2d.
382, 384 (N.Y. 1987) (noting that "the starting point of our analysis is that... ignorance
of the law is no excuse").
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effect in the minimization of judicial legislation. The maxim that
ignorance of the law is no defense is also, in part, a product of
the belief in legislative rationality: the law written by a rational
legislature must be knowable.
Whether one is ignorant of the law is a question of one's men-
tal state. The origin of crime relates to the philosophy of sin and
natural law which have historically precluded claims of igno-
rance. As the story has been told, evil is fundamentally known.
The classical criminal law range of mental states 5 attempts to
proscribe a world where the more evil minded should be more
severely punished for a given act than the less evil minded doing
the same act. Evil mindedness exists in degrees which range
from acts of intention, recklessness, negligence and mindless-
ness.6 However, certain crimes are defined by the act only, and
do not include a state of mind. This concept of evil is rendered
latinate, in part, with the quaint notion of mala in se or mala
prohibita crimes. 7 When a crime is evil in itself, we are supposed
to know so and, therefore, not do it. Our knowledge of the crime
is inherent in our humanity, justice giving some slack to the in-
sane, but not the stupid. We all know how to sin. Ignorance
that murder is a crime is no excuse for the crime of murder.
When a crime is merely evil because Man has called it evil,
there must be sufficient notice of the crime to be condemned in a
civilized society. Sufficient notice can be established by consti-
tutional imperatives, rendering a vague law less so, or mandat-
ing that the conduct must necessarily produce some level of
feeling in the actor that his acts may be regulated. Who is worse
or more deserving of punishment: a man in possession of an ille-
5 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 3.4 (2d ed. 1986).
Numerous mental states exist in the criminal law in varying degrees of severity. Id. For
example, acts of intention, recklessness, and negligence. Id.; see also Paul H. Robinson, A
Brief History of Distinctions in Criminal Culpability, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 815, 815 (1986).
The Model Penal Code, however, has reduced "nearly eighty miscellaneous culpability
terms to five carefully defined levels": purposely, knowingly, recklessly, negligently and
strict liability. Id.
6 For extended discussion of this issue, see United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825
F.Supp. 485, 489 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (discussing requirement of proof of mens rea as basis
for criminal punishment).
7 See LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 5, at § 1.6 (stating mala in se crimes are wrong in
themselves or inherently evil, while male prohibita crimes are only wrong because leg-
islature has prohibited them); see also State v. Horton, 139 N.C. 588, 588 (1905) (defining
malum in se crimes as those which are "naturally evil as adjudged by the sense of a civi-
lized community" and malum prohibitm crimes as those which are wrong only because
statute says so).
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gal automatic weapon but does not know the gun is illegal or
automatic; a man who has an illegal automatic weapon but does
not know that possession is illegal; a man who knows he has
committed a crime by possessing the gun? The ancient practice
of paring evil to match a punishment seems out of place and out
of mind in modern crimes which seek ultimately to avoid certain
behaviors or risks.8
The vagueness of criminal statutes creates additional prob-
lems. First, due process is not afforded a defendant charged
with an unknown crime, thereby offending our collective sense of
fairness and respect for law.9 Of course, determining what is suf-
ficiently vague to qualify for relief on this ground is a subjective
determination. Second, vague crimes are useless endeavors be-
cause of their inability to achieve deterrence.1 0 If the objective is
to mold conduct, how can a criminal statute work if the putative
criminal does not know the conduct is prohibited? The language
of a statute may be vague, although the general subject matter
may afford fair notice of regulation, or it may be precise in its
prohibition, but no one would know that the conduct is subject to
regulation. Finally, vague laws might be saved by writing or
construing such laws to include knowledge of illegality of the
conduct by the actor as an element of the crime. How can a
8 See DALE SEREST, CONSCIENCE AND COMMAND 70 (1994) (noting that individuals
choose to do evil, believing that it is good); see also HERBERT LIONEL HART, PUNISHMENT
AND RESPONSIBILITY 136 (1968) (discussing stupidity and evil).
9 See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 4, at § 2.3. Originally at common law, there was
no constitutionally based vagueness doctrine. Id. Courts simply refused to enforce laws
which they considered to be too uncertain; vagueness was deemed to exist when "men of
common intelligence... necessarily [had] to guess at its meaning and differled] as to its
application." Id. Today, however, the void-for-vagueness doctrine is deeply entrenched in
5th and 14th amendment due process principles. Id. "Undue vagueness in the statute
will result in its being held unconstitutional, whether the uncertainty goes to the previ-
ous persons within the scope of the statute, the conduct which is forbidden, or the pun-
ishment which may be imposed." Id.
10 See id. at § 1.5. "The broad purposes of the criminal law are, of course, to make
people do what society regards as desirable and to prevent them from doing what society
considers to be undesirable." Id. "Since criminal law is framed in terms of imposing pun-
ishment for bad conduct, rather than of granting rewards for good conduct, the emphasis
is more on the prevention of the undesirable than on the encouragement of the desir-
able." Id.; see also FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, PERSPECTIVES ON DETERRENCE 3 (1971).
The theory of simple deterrence is that threats can reduce crime by causing a change
of heart, induced by the unpleasantness of the specific consequences threatened.
Many individuals who are tempted by a particular form of threatened behavior will,
according to this construct, refrain from committing the offense because the pleasure
they might obtain is more than offset by the risk of great unpleasantness communi-
cated by a legal threat.
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crime be vague if to be guilty of it you must know you have com-
mitted the crime?
The maxim that ignorance of law is no excuse justifiably
achieved maxim status for several reasons. It is believed that
rational enforcement and publication of law contribute to volun-
tary compliance which, therefore, leads to a more ordered soci-
ety. Force of arms and coercion are unnecessary tools for the ra-
tional sovereign. Automatically crimes are rendered sensible
because the regulation of conduct is rational or at least consis-
tent with social mores and absent political treason, formal
crimes seemed simpler. General explanations have been offered
in support of the maxim.11 Proponents have historically argued
that the rule is necessary because proof of knowledge of legality
would be difficult 12 and society must presume such knowledge
for an ordered state. 13 The rule encourages individuals to explore
their obligations. 14 Moreover, the maxim serves as an interpre-
tive tool and drafting form: with the maxim, there is no need to
be explicit that ignorance of law is not an excuse. 15
11 See Ronald A. Cass, Ignorance of the Law: A Maxim Reexamined, 17 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 671, 689 (noting five defenses of maxim: administrative practicality; deterrence;
fundamental belief that all men are presumed to know law; argument that such igno-
rance is inherently blameworthy; and failure to recognize maxim would undermine
court's role); see also JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, LECTURE XXV 238-39
(R. Campbell ed. 1875) (arguing "that if ignorance of the law were admitted as a ground
of exemption, the Courts would be involved in questions which were scarcely possible to
solve, and which would render the administration of justice next to impracticable");
Jerome Hall, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, 33 IND. L.J. 1, 36-37 (1957) (stat-
ing that differing types of criminal statutes require judicial application in order to prop-
erly distinguish between crimes); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 419 (1958) (emphasizing ignorance itself is blameworthy).
But see GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE CRIMINAL LAW, THE GENERAL PART 289 (2d ed. 1961)(noting that proposition that every man is presumed to know law is now generally re-
jected as it is insufficient foundation for maxim).
12 See Livingston Hall & Selig J. Seligman, Mistake of Law and Mens Rea, 8 U. CHI.
L. REV. 641, 646-48 (1941) (noting that pragmatic bases for doctrine lies in fact that, ab-
sent such presumption, administration of justice would be virtually impossible); see also
LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 5, at § 5.1 (outlining arguments in favor of maxim). But see
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 48 (Little, Brown, and Co. 1909) (1881)
(discounting defense of doctrine by recommending remedy which would shift burden of
proof of proving ignorance from court onto lawbreaker); Cass, supra note 11, at 689
(noting that defense premised on administration of justice argument was successfully
attacked by Holmes and is no longer raised).
13 See HOLMES, supra note 12, at 48-51 (explaining why ignorance of law can be no
excuse).
14 See Hart, Jr., supra note 11, at 401 (examining goals of criminal law).
15 See generally Hall, supra, note 11, at 14 (distinguishing mistake or ignorance of
fact from ignorance of law; concluding that courts should determine if crimes can be ex-
cused due to ignorance of law). But see WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 289 (stating that rule
can cause hardship); Cass, supra note 10, at 689-99 (noting harshness of rule when ap-
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Requiring proof of knowledge of illegality, especially in tax
crimes, creates procedural difficulties. Prosecution becomes
more difficult, but the extent of potential difficulty is debatable.
The ridiculousness of a claim of ignorance and the wisdom of ju-
ries is frequently seen as sufficient protection against false
claims of confusion or delusion. 16 Nonetheless, claims of igno-
rance may create a hook for juries to acquit where there is confu-
sion about complex areas of the law, dealing with taxes or
money laundering, where ignorance of the law may be an ex-
cuse. 17 Further, crimes requiring proof of such knowledge carry
the implication that ignorance is to ones benefit. 18
The current increase in laws in which knowledge of illegality is
an element of the crime, is a product of both judicial and legisla-
tive sensitivity to perceived complexity and distrust of institu-
tions. Further, careless draftsmanship has often created an
opening for an interpretation which negates the maxim. None-
theless the wide array of cases which now find ignorance of law
as an excuse convey a feeling that the law is intrusive, complex,
secretive, loophole-filled, and enforced by malevolent agencies
with extra-legal axes to grind, such as the IRS, BATF, INS, or
even the Department of Labor. Consequently, the maxim is no
longer treated as an important interpretive device. In cases
dealing chiefly with money, drugs and sex, the use of the old
maxim took a back seat1 9 to the modern techniques of gram-
plied to lesser regulatory crimes not generally considered to be inherently immoral);
Henry W. Seney, "When Empty Terrors Overawe"- Our Criminal Law Defenses, 19
WAYNE L. REV. 1359, 1364-76 (1973) (detailing reasons why maxim is appropriate).
16 See WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 291.
If a normal adult fires at another at point-blank range, his defense that he did not
intend to kill would be received with incredulity, and so would a defense that he did
not know murder to be a crime. On the other hand, if he shoots another when hunt-
ing at dusk, his defense that he did not intent to kill a man might be believed.
Id.
17 See generally Dylan Lager Murray, Plain English or Plain Confusing?, 62 Mo. L.
REV. 345, 345-47 (1997) (noting existence of barriers to juror comprehension).
18 See HOLMES, supra note 12, at 48 (stating "the true explanation of the rule is the
same as that which accounts for the law's indifference to a man's particular tempera-
ment, faculties, and so forth. Public Policy sacrifices the individual to the general good...
It is no doubt true that there are many cases in which the criminal could not have known
that he was breaking the law, but to admit the excuse at all would be to encourage igno-
rance ... and justice to the individual is rightly outweighed by the larger interests on the
other side of the scales."); WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 290 (quoting belief that reason for
rule was that in its absence, those who remained in perpetual ignorance would be re-
warded).
19 See Michael Vitiello, Does Culpability Matter?. Statutory Construction Under 42
U.S.C. §6982, 6 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 187, 191 (1993) (arguing that claim that ignorance of
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marians and civil libertarians.20 As a result, many new crimes
allow ignorance of the law as an excuse.
Cheek v. United States21 represents the modern popularization
of the notion that ignorance of law might excuse criminal con-
duct. In Cheek, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that subjective
actual knowledge of illegality was an element of the crime of
"willful" tax evasion 22 pursuant to I.R.C. § 7201.23 John Cheek
argued that he sincerely believed that the tax laws permitted
him to claim sixty dependency allowances, that wages were not
income, and that the Sixteenth Amendment was unconstitu-
tional.24 The Seventh Circuit recognized that only objectively
reasonable misunderstandings of the law serve to negate willful-
ness. 25 The trial court consequently withdrew from the jury's
deliberation consideration of whether Cheek's actions were rea-
sonable. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, reaffirm-
ing that, in tax crimes, the word "willfully" means with actual
subjective knowledge of the illegality of the conduct. Therefore,
law is no defense has become overshadowed by notion that criminal liability should be
premised on blameworthy conduct); Bruce R. Grace, Note, Ignorance of the Law as an
Excuse, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1392, 1392-93 (1986) (noting that "the principle that igno-
rance of the law is no excuse, long thought to be basic to criminal law, is no longer ap-
propriate when criminal law applies in surprising ways to otherwise ordinary behavior").
Compare Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 119-24 (1974) (applying common law
rule to criminal statute), and United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp.,
402 U.S. 558, 563 (1971) (interpreting ambiguous criminal environmental statute by ap-
plying maxim that ignorance of law is no excuse), with Liparota v. United States, 471
U.S. 419, 434 (1985) (discarding maxim in favor of more persuasive argument that crimi-
nal conduct must be premised on finding of culpability).
20 See generally Roger Colivaux, What is Law? A Search for Legal Meaning and Good
Judging Under a Textualist Approach, 72 IND. L.J. 1133, 1133 (1997) (noting various
methods of statutory interpretation and focusing particularly on growing popularity of
Justice Scalia's Textualist approach); Vitiello, supra note 19, at 190 (noting that signifi-
cant number of commentators, courts and legislators strongly support belief that crimi-
nal sanctions should be reserved for culpable individuals).
21 498 U.S. 192 (1991).
22 See id. at 205-206.
23 I.R.C. § 7201 (1997) provides:
Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed
by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other penalties provided by
law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than
$100,000 ($500,000 in the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 5
years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.
Id.
24 See 498 U.S. at 194-95.
25 See, e.g., United States v. Buckner, 830 F.2d 102, 123-24 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting
that arguments challenging constitutionality of federal government's power to tax under
Sixteenth Amendment are "tired arguments" not considered to be objectively reasonable);
Coleman v. CIR, 791 F.2d 68, 70 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting that persons wages may be taxed
and penalty applied since this has become frivolous argument).
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testing the actor's beliefs for reasonableness improperly relieves
the government of its burden to prove all elements of the crime.
Although Cheek was simply a restatement of old tax crime
principles, 26 it was immediately treated as headline news. 27 In
tax prosecutions, Cheek was raised to reexamine and unsettle
notions of proof, such as admissibility of evidence used to bolster
a defendant's claim of confusion 28 or use of the "ostrich" instruc-
tion29 to infer knowledge of illegality when the defendant had
purposely avoided it.30 Moreover, the Cheek decision raised the
question as to the mental state required to impose civil tax pen-
alties which contained the word "willfully".31
Fundamentally Cheek presented nothing new, its conclusion
was bound by a series of old precedents. The Court, in review-
ing that history, reiterated that the construction of "willfully"
was the product of the tax code structure and judicial fear of in-
discriminate prosecutions of crimes produced by a complex and
arcane statute. 32 Cheek did not reconsider the status of the
maxim that ignorance of law is no excuse, but scrutinized non-
traditional crimes seeking to find reasons to avoid the implica-
26 See United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 11 (1976) (softening impact of old
common law principle that ignorance of law is no excuse by requiring finding of evil mo-
tive for valid tax crime conviction). See generally United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346,
360 (1973) (noting that willful means "evil intent" and is necessary element).
27 See Tony Mauro, 'Sincere' Tax Evaders May Skip Jail, USA TODAY, Jan. 9, 1991,
at 1 (stating that Supreme Court's ruling in Cheek allows "sincere" tax evaders to escape
jail time).
28 See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 936 F.2d 1056, 1063 (9th Cir. 1991) (attempting
to use Supreme Court's holding in Cheek to undermine trial court's prohibition of evi-
dence that might have enabled jury to understand sincerity of plaintiffs confusion re-
garding statute),
29 See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 5, at § 10-04. The doctrine of willful blindness or
deliberate ignorance exists in situations where "a person is aware of a high probability of
the existence of a fact in question, and he deliberately fails to investigate in order to
avoid confirmation of the fact." Id. Additionally, "an instruction to the jury in this regard
is sometimes called the 'ostrich instruction'." Id.
30 See Mattingly v. United States, 924 F.2d 785, 790-91 (8th Cir. 1981) (attempting
to use Cheek to undermine jury charge of willful blindness by arguing that actual knowl-
edge not "willful blindness" is required under § 6701). See generally J. Andrew Hoerner,
"Cheeky" Defenses in Vogue, Says Bruton, 54 TAX NOTES 934, 934 (1992) (noting that Jus-
tice Department has enormous amount of cases pending as result of Cheek decision).
31 See Williams v. United States, 931 F.2d 805, 810 (11th Cir. 1991) (using Cheek to
reexamine requisite mental state required for imposing civil tax penalty in statute con-
taining "willfully"); see also Mark D. Yochum, Cheek is Chic Ignorance of the Law Is an
Excuse for Tax Crimes-A Fashion That Does Not Wear Well, 31 DUQ. L. REV. 249, 252
(1993) (analyzing cases decided in wake of Cheek in which "willfully" and corresponding
mental state were addressed).
32 See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 204-05 (1991) (examining case constru-
ing willfulness requirement in criminal provisions of Internal Revenue Code to require
proof of knowledge of law).
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tion of the maxim. The complexity, at least as perceived and ar-
ticulated by judges, of crimes regulating finance and the move-
ment of money, motivates interpretation of statutes in a fashion
contrary to the maxim.
To make knowledge of illegality a crime, the legislatures have
never used plain English to tell us that an anti-maxim mental
state is required. Rather courts find this anti-maxim mental
state where the statute includes the troublesome word "will-
fully". Spies v. United States33 and United States v. Murdock34
laid the foundation for the Cheek decision. In Spies, the defen-
dant admitted that he had sufficient income to pay his income
taxes and file a return, but did not do so. 35 He was subsequently
convicted of the felony of willful income tax evasion.36 The
opinion suggests that he was a good man, though mentally ill
when the tax return had to be filed.3 7 The trial court denied
Spies' requested instruction that "willful" within the statute re-
quired a more affirmative act than simple inactivity or failure to
act.38 Faced with tax code provisions containing the term "will-
fully," the Court unsuccessfully looked to legislative history.39
The Court concluded that in the hierarchy of offenses, a felony
must have a greater or more evil mental state than a misde-
meanor.40 "The question here is whether there is a distinction
between the acts necessary to make out the felony and those
which make out the misdemeanor.. ,,"41 On appeal the Supreme
Court held that Spies had not been sufficiently evil and his eva-
sion conviction was reversed. 42
The Spies distinction does not impel the conclusion that sub-
jective knowledge of illegality is required, merely that there be
some difference in the amount of evil displayed. Spies intones
that the law is "complicated" and its purpose is not "to penalize
frank difference of opinion or innocent errors made despite rea-
33 317 U.S. 492, 497-500 (1943) (discussing Court's interpretation of word "willfully").
34 290 U.S. 389, 395 (1933) (illustrating necessary belief to be guilty of "willfully"
committing a crime).
35 See Spies, 317 U.S. at 493.
36 See id. at 492-93.
37 See id. at 493.
38 See id. at 494.
39 See id. at 495.
40 See Spies, 317 U.S. at 497-98.
41 See id. at 497.
42 See id. at 500.
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sonable care."43 Spies, however, does not rest on the need for an
affirmative act as opposed to simple neglect. The Court noted
that "[m]ere voluntary and purposeful, as distinguished from ac-
cidental, omission.., might meet the test of willfulness. ' 44 The
Court concluded that "willfulness" included some element of "evil
motive" in light of the complexity of the statute and the structure
of the Internal Revenue Code.45
In Murdock,46 the court reviewed the meaning of the term
"willfully" in the ancient misdemeanor, the willful failure to sup-
ply information. 47 Murdock was called before a revenue agent
and refused to answer, fearing self-incrimination. 48 He re-
quested an instruction to the jury that if "his refusal to answer
questions [was] given in good faith and based upon actual belief,"
then his violation was not willful.49 The trial court denied the in-
struction based on its interpretation that "willful" meant "volun-
tarily" and stated that in its opinion Murdock was guilty.50
After noting that the word "often" means intentional rather
than accidental, the Court stated that it "generally" means "bad
purpose."5 1 The Court cited several nineteenth century opinions
enumerating various mental states including: "without justifi-
43 See id. at 496.
44 See id. at 497-98.
45 Compare Spies, 317 U.S. at 498, with United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 12
(1976) (finding that "willful" in the context of tax statute meant only voluntary inten-
tional violation of known legal duty rather than finding of "evil motive"), and United
States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 346 (1973) (stating that 'willfully' connotes voluntary, in-
tentional violation of known legal duty and evil motive).
46 290 U.S. 389 (1933).
47 See id. at 391-394.; see also 26 U.S.C. § 1265 (1926). "Any person required under
this Act to pay any tax .... who willfully fails to pay such tax, make such return, keep
such records, or supply such information, .. . shall.., be guilty of a misdemeanor..."
48 See Murdock, 290 U.S. at 393. Murdock refused to answer the questions of the
revenue agent surrounding deductions taken on his 1927 and 1928 income tax returns
for money paid to others out of fear of self-incrimination in possible future prosecutions
under state statutes. Id. See generally 21 AM. JUR. 2D. Criminal Law § 937 (1981) (dis-
cussing failure to answer questions in fear of self incrimination).
49 See Murdock, 290 U.S. at 393 (holding trial court erred in stating opinion that re-
spondent was guilty beyond reasonable doubt).
50 See id. The trial judge stated:
So far as the facts are concerned in this case, Gentlemen of the Jury, I want to in-
struct you that whatever the Court may say as to the facts, is only the Court's view.
You are at liberty to entirely disregard it. The Court feels from the evidence in this
case, that the government has sustained its burden and has proved that the defen-
dant is guilty in manner and form as charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id.
51 See id. at 394 (quoting Felton v. United States, 96 U.S. 699 (1877) (stating that
"willful "means not merely 'voluntary', 'but with a bad purpose").
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able excuse"; "stubbornly, obstinately, perversely"; "done without
ground for believing it is lawful"; and "careless disregard [ofj the
right to so act."52 Clearly, this range included not just subjective
knowledge of illegality but also that an actor must have reason
to know of the criminality of his conduct. One may compare this
later notion with the minimal requirements of due process or the
rules against vague crimes. The Court distilled this morass to
conclude that "willfully," embedded in a revenue act, meant "evil
motive,"53  and declared that "Congress did not intend that a
person, by reason of a bona fide misunderstanding as to his i-
ability, should become a criminal. '54
Should one go back as far as England and Rome to find that
ignorance of law is not an excuse for crime?55 The Nineteenth
Century code words "evil motive" reveal that knowledge of ille-
gality is an element of the crime. The words "evil motive" were
not part of the statutes but were derived by courts from the word
"willfully". The American genesis of this occasional interpreta-
tion began with a series of cases dealing with the obstruction of
the mail.
In United States v. Barney, 56 citizen Barney owned a livery
stable. The mailman on horse stopped at Barney's place along
the Susquehanna River. 57 Barney fed the horses, but the mail-
man did not pay for the feed. 58 Barney would not let the horses
go and held the animals as a lien for payment. 59 Barney was
charged with having "willfully obstructed the passage of the
public mail."60 The court concluded that Barney had no right to a
52 See id. at 394-95 (citations omitted).
53 See id. at 395.
54 Murdock, 290 U.S. at 396. See Citron v. Citron, 722 F.2d 14, 17 (2d Cir. 1983).
Federal Wiretapping Statute containing willfully requires "a voluntary intentional viola-
tion and perhaps also a reckless disregard of, a knowledge of legal duty." Id.; see also
Malouche v. J.H. Management Co., Inc., 839 F.2d 1024, 1026 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding civil
liability for alleged wiretapping requires proof of criminal "willfulness").
55 The principle that ignorance of the law is not an excuse was originally derived
from Roman law. See Cass supra note 11, at 685. "Roman law did not allow ignorance as
a defense to actions under the jus gentium, the law derived form the common customs of
the Italian tribes and thought to embody the basic rules of conduct any civilized person
would deduce from proper reasoning." Id. Ignorance of the less common-sense jus civile
was a defense to woman, males less than 25 years of age, soldiers, peasants, and persons
of small intelligence. Id.




60 Barney, 24 F. Gas. at 1015.
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lien on the horses and had to look to Congress for payment. 61
Importantly, the court concluded the statute did not permit the
defense of justification. 62 That is, even though Barney may have
actually believed his conduct was lawful, the statute prohibited
intentional obstruction of the mail.6 3
In United States v. Hart,64 John Hart, constable of Philadel-
phia, pulled over a mail carrier for recklessly driving a mail
stage. Hart was also charged with willful obstruction of the
mail.65 The court concluded Hart had a defense with the entire
logic of the opinion set in a rhetorical question: "Suppose the offi-
cer had a warrant against a felon.., in the stage, or that the
driver should commit murder in the street...; could it be con-
tended that the sanctity of the mail would extend to protect
those persons against arrest because a temporary stoppage of
the mail would be the consequence?" 66
What is the difference between these two cases? Their simi-
larity may be that neither actor had knowledge of the illegality
of his act. It may be, however, that one court was trying to cre-
ate an affirmative defense of justification rather than explicating
that which is an element of the offense. 67
In United States v. Harvey,68 James Harvey, a Maryland con-
stable, briefly detained a mail carrier to serve him with a war-
rant in an action in trespass. Harvey did not know that Con-
gress had prohibited willful stoppage of the mail even when the
detention was brief.69 The matter came before Justice Taney.70
61 See id. at 1015-16.
62 See id.
63 See id. at 1016. The court notes that to so interpret "willfully" to add a defense
would be an unwarranted assumption of legislative power. Id.
64 26 F. Cas. 193 (Cir. Ct. D. Pa. 1817).
65 See id. at 194.
66 See id. at 194-95.
67 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.03 (1974). (1) Which provides that "conduct is
justifiable when it is required or authorized by... (a) the law governing the execution of
legal process... or (e) any other provision of law imposing a public duty." Id. This de-
fense is available if the actor "believes" he is justified. See generally LAFAVE & SCOTT,
supra note 5, at § 5.5 (elaborating on justification defense as found in Model Penal Code §
3.03).
68 United States v. Harvey, 26 F. Cas. 206, 207 (Cir. Ct. D. Ma. 1845) (finding war-
rant in civil action against mail carrier is no justification for officer obstructing passage
of mail).
69 See id. at 206.
70 See id.; see also United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 485 (1868) (explaining conflict
between decisions in Hart and Harvey); United States v. Sears, 55 F. 268, 270 (1893) (at-
tempting to explain Harvey justification).
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Justice Taney noted the conflict between Barney and Hart and
concluded that the Barney decision should be followed as the
controlling law. 71 The warrant was not considered a justification,
and as Harvey purposefully caused a delay, he was guilty of the
crime. 72 Again, there is a distinction between the defense, the
serving of civil process, and the defense of criminal process in
Hart.73
The preceding cases seem to provide the early foundation for
the confusion surrounding the interpretation of the word "will-
fully" or the maxim in the early Nineteenth Century. These
cases provide the background to a discussion of the seminal deci-
sion in United States v. Three R.R. Cars.74 The discussion of
Judge Hall in this opinion laid the foundation for the modern in-
terpretation of "willfully".
In Three R.R. Cars, railroad cars full of flour, crossed into the
United States from Canada. 75 The cars were sealed in Canada by
the consul, allowing them to cross the border at Niagara without
inspection. 76 Before the cars arrived at the American destina-
tion, the seals were broken and removed.77 To "willfully break"
such a seal was a felony 78 and a car with a broken seal was for-
feit. 79 A special verdict found that the seals were removed by an
employee without knowledge that the seals were present and
without illegal purpose. 80
Judge Hall noted that "willfully" is a troublesome word81 and
defined it as "'[g]overned by will without yielding to reason; ob-
stinate; perverse; inflexible; stubborn; refractory.' 82 The term
"subjective knowledge of illegality" was not included in the defi-
nition. In the face of ambiguity, he noted that the intention of
71 See id.
72 See id.
73 See Kirby, 74 U.S. at 482 (holding statute applied to those who know acts per-
formed will have effect to act with intention).
74 28 F.Cas. 144, 147 (N.D.N.Y. 1868) (stating it must be shown that defendant had
both intention and knowledge to be found guilty).




79 See Three R.R. Cars, 28 F.Cas. at 145.
80 See id.
81 See id. at 146.
82 See Id.
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the legislature must govern. 83 However, when the suggestion
was made that the legislature's intent should be reflected by the
maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse, he disagreed.84
Judge Hall concluded that Congress could not have intended to
classify this act as a felony when "committed without any illegal
or improper motive, and under the honest belief that it was en-
tirely right and proper."85 The court identified three modern fac-
tors to be considered in the anti-maxim interpretation of "will-
fully": whether the act or crime is a regulatory offense; the
punishment is a felony; and if there is a plausible chance or ac-
tual existence of a subjective belief in rectitude.
Judge Hall recognized that his interpretation, that ignorance
of law excused the crime, varied with Chief Justice Taney's view
in Harvey8 6 and concluded that Taney's opinion lacked weight
because it was made in "the hurry of a circuit."87 Judge Hall
noted that Harvey must be wrong as Congress could not have in-
tended to punish a public official "honestly endeavoring to do
what he really believed to be his official duty."88 Judge Hall ar-
gued "willfully" was sometimes inserted by Congress into stat-
utes to prevent the injustice which might result from "strict ap-
plication" of the maxim "in opposition to the real truth of the
case."89 The court in Three R.R. Cars, by interpreting "willfully"
as requiring proof of knowledge of illegality,90 was apparently
confining that reading to what are pejoratively termed regula-
tory offenses, almost always dealing with money or taxes. 91
83 See id.
84 See Three R.R. Cars, 28 F.Cas. at 146.
85 See id.
86 See id. at 146-47.
87 See id. at 147.
88 See id.
89 See Three R.R. Cars, 28 F.Cas. at 147.
90 See Felton v. United States, 96 U.S. 699, 701-04 (1877). In Felton v. United States,
the Supreme Court reversed a judgment assessed for knowingly and willfully tampering
with certain distillery apparatus because there was no proof defendant knew the appara-
tus was inadequate. Id. As to "willfully", he quoted the ancients that it meant "with a bad
purpose" or "evil intent." Id.
91 See Stephen B. Chapman, Are Obnoxious Wastes More Like Machine Guns or
Hand Grenades?: Mens Rea Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act After
Staples v. United States, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 1117, 1118 (1995). Regulatory or public of-
fenses are offenses created when the legislatures incorporate a form of strict liability into
criminal sanctions intended to enforce regulations enacted to promote the public good.
Id. These crimes: regulate dangerous devises or products; heighten duties of those in-
volved in industries affecting the public interest/welfare; and depend on no mental state
but consist of only forbidden acts or omissions; see also Staples v. United States, 511 U.S.
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The Supreme Court in the late Nineteenth Century reviewed a
series of cases from the world of banking which were already the
subject of federal regulation. In Potter v. United States,92 Potter,
as an officer of the Maverick National Bank, certified a check for
payment when there were insufficient funds on deposit for the
drawer.93 He was convicted of willfully violating banking laws
which required that such funds to be present.94 Potter appar-
ently knew that the deposits were insufficient, but believed that
the check would be covered by a loan or through daily deposits. 95
The trial court refused to hear this evidence, holding that the
statute simply prohibited purposeful overdraft certification and
that Potter's intentions were not relevant to the criminality of
his conduct. 96
The Supreme Court reversed, interpreting "willfully" in a two
step process. 97 The statute imposed a penalty on the willful vio-
lation of the banking laws and for certifying certain checks be-
fore the balances had cleared certain books. 98 "Willfully" ap-
peared in the first part of the statute and not the second.99 The
Court, thinking of Congress as rational draftsmen, concluded
that the difference must be of significance. 100 "Willfully" must
600, 628 (1994) (Stevens, J. dissenting) ("[Plublic welfare crimes" exist which place upon
corporations strict liability standard).
92 155 U.S. 438 (1894).
93 See id. at 441-42.
94 See id. In Potter, Rev. St. § 5208 provided that it shall be unlawful for any officer,
clerk, or agent of any national banking association to certify any check drawn upon the
association unless the person or company drawing the check has on deposit with the as-
sociation, at the time such check is certified, an amount of money equal to the amount
specified in suck check. Id. at 439. Section 13 of 22 Stat. 166 provided that any "willful"
violation of § 5208 was punishable as a misdemeanor. Id.
95 See id. at 441-42.
96 See id. at 444-47.
97 See Potter, 155 U.S. at 443-48; see also Ratzlafv. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 135-
36 (1994) (holding "willfulness" requirement is read by courts to require both knowledge
and specific intent).
98 See Potter, 155 U.S. at 446.
99 See id. at 446-48. In reaching its decision, the Court applied a grammarian tech-
nique of interpretation. Id. at 443-48. The Court stated:
while it is true that care must be taken not to weaken.. .statutes designed to protect
depositors... against the wrong doing of banking officials, it is of equal importance
that they should not be so construed as to make transactions of such officials, carried
on with the utmost honesty, and in sincere belief that no wrong was being done,
criminal offenses, and subjecting them to severe punishments.
Id. at 447.
100 See id. at 445-46. See generally Susan F. Mandiberg, The Dilemma of Mental
State in Federal Regulatory Crimes: The Environmental Example, 25 ENVTL. L. 1165,
1177-78 (1995) (explaining mens rea as application of concept of evil mind, citing Potter
as example in banking crimes arena).
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mean something more than voluntarily; it must mean evil mo-
tive. 101 Justice Field stated:
While it is true that care must be taken not to weaken...
statutes designed to protect depositors ... against the wrong
doing of banking officials, it is of equal importance that they
should not be so construed as to make transactions of such
officials, carried on with the utmost honesty, and in sincere
belief that no wrong was being done, criminal offenses, and
subjecting them to severe punishments. 10 2
It may be noted, at least with respect to the concern for "severe
punishments" that the offense in Potter was merely a misde-
meanor. Nonetheless, since knowledge of illegality was an issue,
the evidence of the origin of Potter's motive should have been
admissible. His conviction was thus reversed. 103
The anti-maxim interpretation of the word "willfully" was
minuscule, compared to the innumerable cases which followed
maxim and interpreted "willfully" to mean simply an intentional
act. In American Surety Co. of N.Y v. Sullivan,104 Judge
Learned Hand reviewed the action of Sullivan, a sea captain,
against a consul for willful neglect of his duties for failure to is-
sue a visa. Through a legal confusion it appears that the consul
did not issue the visa and was held liable for damages. 105 In af-
firming the award, Judge Learned Hand noted:
The word willful even in criminal statutes, means no more
than that the person charged with the duty knows what he
is doing. It does not mean that, in addition, he supposes
that he is breaking the law. 106
101 See Potter, 155 U.S. at 446.
102 See id. at 447.
103 Spurr v. United States, 174 U.S. 728, 735 (1899) (Brown and McKenna, JJ., dis-
senting without an opinion). In Spurr v. United States, the Supreme Court reversed the
conviction of a conscientious bank officer who before certifying checks regularly con-
sulted with other officials at the bank, who in turn erroneously informed him that suffi-
cient funds were on hand. Id. The Court cited with some approval the trial court's in-
struction that "Im]ere negligence or carelessness, unaccompanied by bad faith, would not
render him guilty." Id. at 739. Second, the Court itself commented that "evil design may
be presumed if the officer purposely keeps himself in ignorance ... or is grossly indiffer-
ent to his duty..." Id. at 735.
104 7 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1925).
105 See id. at 605-06 (holding word "willful" in criminal statutes means that person
charged with duty knows what he is doing).
106 Id. at 606. See Grand Trunk R. Co. v. United States, 229 F. 116, 119-20 (7th Cir.
1915) (holding that "willfully" has uniformly been held not to require evil intent, but only
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If any common theme of value can be produced from these
cases, it is that in finding an anti-maxim meaning for "willfully",
courts at least proffer that their goal and result is simply finding
what the legislative body intended to mean. Of course, one can
view judicial protestations of this sort as a cover-up for legisla-
tion by the judiciary. One argument for a conventional interpre-
tation of "willfully" is that the legislature knows the maxim that
ignorance of law is not an excuse and consequently writes crimes
believing that they will be so read.107 The notion that a legisla-
tive body can produce or hold a singular intent when using a
word so motile is even odd. Perhaps a stronger argument can be
made that the legislature knows that "willfully" creates such a
range of possibilities and in issuing such a word places the bur-
den of interpretation on the judiciary.108 The dynamic relation-
ship between legislative abdication and judicial activism is sup-
ported in decisions where statutes are construed to save them. 109
This notion is portrayed when the courts deal with an act of rac-
ist violence.
In Screws v. United States,110 Sheriff Screws, who had beaten
that one should have purposely or intentionally failed to obey that statute, having
knowledge of the facts); People v. Foster, 204 A.D. 295, 300 (N.Y. App .Div. 1923), affd,
236 N.Y 610 (1923) (stating that "willfully" includes idea that act intentionally done with
wrongful purpose, or with design to injure another, or one committed out of mere wan-
tonness or lawlessness).
107 Indeed, such a proposition is valid. Courts have defined several principles
around which statutes are construed, and when the maxim is applicable. See e.g., United
States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 560 (1971). Regulatory
offenses, as opposed to other crimes, are subject to excusal from application of maxim
that ignorance of the law is no excuse).
108 See United States v. Wells, 117 S. Ct. 921, 936 (1997) (noting that late 1940's
were "marked by spirit of cooperation between Congress and Federal Judiciary" during
which Congress looked for courts to play important role in lawmaking process by filling
gaps in statutory text); see also Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National
Clammers Assoc., 453 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1981) (asserting that legislatively created statute
was interpreted by judiciary).
109 See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 93 (1945) (stating that enforcing vague
statute with unascertainable standard of guilt is similar to practice of Caligula; Roman
emperor who published laws in such fine print and posted them in dark corner and then
proceeded to construe statute such that vagueness issue averted).
110 325 U.S. 91, 93 (1945). Section 20 of the Criminal Code, Title 18 U.S.C. § 52
(1994) states:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or
penalties, on account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color, or
race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined not more than
$1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
Id.
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a black prisoner to death, was convicted of willfully depriving a
citizen of his rights by reason of his color. The Sheriffs defense
was that the statute violated the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment for failing to have an "ascertainable standard
of guilt."'111 Taking the position of Screws rhetorically, Justice
Douglas wrote:
Congress did not define what it desired to punish but re-
ferred the citizen to a comprehensive law library in order to
ascertain what acts were prohibited. To enforce such a stat-
ute would be like sanctioning the practice of Caligula who
published the law, but it was written in a very small hand,
and posted up in a corner, so that no one could make a copy
of it.112
Justice Douglas was concerned that if "willfulness" is simply
purposeful, one could be guilty of the crime even though the citi-
zen had rights yet to be determined. 113 This vagueness problem
was solved, in Justice Douglas' view, by interpreting "willfully"
as requiring proof that the actor had a "specific intent to deprive
a person of a federal right made definite by decision or other rule
of law .... -"114 Justice Douglas added that "specific intent"
meant not simply subjective knowledge of illegality, but also in-
cluded acts done "in reckless disregard" of definitive rights. 115
In order to reach the conclusion adopted by the plurality, Jus-
tice Douglas' analysis required many steps. First, Justice
Douglas noted the legislative growth of the instant statute, in
which the word "willfully" was added according to legislative his-
tory, made the statute "less severe." 116 Next, Justice Douglas
stated that the word "willful" is malleable in crimes interpreted
III Screws, 325 U.S. at95.
112 Id. at 96 (citations omitted).
113 See id. at 96-98.
114 See id. at 103. Cf United States v. Lanier, 117 S. Ct. 1219, 1221-22 (1997). The
Court reversed the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals which had, in turn, reversed a convic-
tion under 18 U.S.C. § 242 of a state judge who had assaulted women in his chambers.
Id. The Sixth Circuit held improperly that the federal right infringed had to have been
established previous to the act by a decision of the Supreme Court in a case with "fun-
damentally similar facts." Id. Justice Souter, writing for a unanimous court, held that
vagueness concerns, the rule of lenity, or elementary due process, matters which to
Souter are all of a piece, do not require such elevated notice. Id. "IT]he touchstone is
whether the statute, either standing alone or as construed, made it reasonably clear...
that the defendant's conduct was criminal." Id. at 1221-22.
115 Screws, 325 U.S. at 105.
116 See id. at 100 (quoting 43 Cong. Rec., 60th Cong., 2d Sess., 3599).
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"with evil motive." 117 However, Justice Douglas chose not to re-
view the cases that decide whether "willfully" means simply in-
tentional or with knowledge of illegality because it "would not
prove helpful as each turns on its own peculiar facts."118 What
Justice Douglas is doing may be construed as writing law, not
reading it.119 Thus, the statute was saved from unconstitution-
ality for vagueness because now by definition the actor can be
punished only for acts against rights which are legally settled
and were known or recklessly disregarded. 120 Since Screws had
been convicted under instructions which interpreted "willfully"
as simply purposeful, the plurality's opinion was that the judg-
ment should be reversed.121
Interpreting "willfully" beyond simple intent occasions the use
of several techniques designed rhetorically to discern the intent
of the rational legislature in using a word which is inherently
ambiguous. Any interpretation beyond simple intent usually in-
volves an acknowledgment of the competing maxim that igno-
rance of the law is no excuse. While legislative history will be
commonly reviewed, that search is almost always fruitless except
to reinforce ambiguity. Nonetheless, Congress must have meant
something which supports the myth that the statute is written
rationally and the words are not mere surplusage.
The structure of the statute itself offers a modern method of
concluding that willfully carries the extra weight of requiring
proof of knowledge of illegality. Additionally, there is the "fear of
complexity" interpretation which reached a certain height in
Screws, and that such a mental state will insulate citizens
against prosecution for vague crimes by an unrestrained state. 122
117 See id. at 101 (holding that "knowingly" and "willfully" implies knowledge and
determination with bad intent to do it (citing Felton v. Unites States 96 U.S. 699, 702
(1877))).
118 Screws, 325 U.S. at 101.
119 See United States v. Lanier 117 S. Ct. 1219, 1222 (1997). The Supreme Court
criticized the Sixth Circuit's view that Screws creates a common law crime. Id. Simply,
"Screws narrowly construed a broadly worded act." Id.
120 Screws, 325 U.S. at 100.
121 See id. at 112-13. Justice Rutledge concurred. Id. at 113-34. Justice Rutledge
was clear that his interpretation of willfully included recklessness in disregard of rights,
a conclusion he would have come to even if willfully were not in the statute. Id. at 130
n.32.
122 See generally Screws, 325 U.S. at 102 (requiring that act is willful or purposeful
relieves statute of objections that it punishes without warning offense of which accused is
unaware).
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The anti-maxim interpretation achieves the desire by the state
in its criminal statutes to cause citizens to conform their conduct
to the law. The fear is that conduct which is apparently legal,
where the actor does not know that the conduct was regulated,
might create surprise criminal liability. When the penalty is se-
vere, "willfully" can take on the anti-maxim interpretation. Fi-
nally according to the rule of lenity, criminal statutes capable of
multiple interpretations should be construed in favor of the
criminal.
Cheek's re-examination of "willfully" in the federal tax crimes
did not involve all of these techniques. 123 The court was bound
by fifty years of precedent which included the argument that the
tax law is complex. In a neighboring set of laws which deals
with regulating currency transactions, a more full blown analy-
sis has occurred.
Financial institutions are required to report to the Secretary of
the Treasury cash transactions which exceed $10,000.124 The
primary purpose of this statute is to aid in anti-drug law en-
forcement through monitoring large cash transactions in that il-
legal business. A by-product of this monitoring is that informa-
tion might also be obtained to aid in tax collection because the
use of cash is a common way to avoid taxes and escape detection.
Congress was aware that transactions might be "structured" to
avoid the $10,000 level by breaking them up and included in the
statute that "[n]o person shall for the purpose of evading the re-
porting requirements" structure a transaction. 125 A separate
statute set out criminal enforcement of these strictures; a willful
violation is punished by a substantial fine and up to five years of
jail.126
In Ratzlaf v. United States, the Supreme Court concluded that
because "willfully" is contained in the statute, the crime is only
committed if the actor structured a transaction knowing that
structuring was unlawful. 127 In Ratzlaf, Waldemar Ratzlaf lost
123 See generally Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 192 (1991).
124 See 31 U.S.C. § 5313 (1998) (setting forth reporting procedures for certain finan-
cial institutions); 31 CFR § 103.22 (1999) (establishing $10,00.00 as dollar amount which
triggers duty to report).
125 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1998) (prohibiting structuring transactions to evade reporting
requirements).
126 31 U.S.C § 5322(a) (1998) (setting forth criminal penalties for wilifull violations of
reporting requirements).
127 See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. at 135, 136-37 (1994).
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$160,000 at a Nevada casino and was given a week to pay.128 He
returned with a $100,000 cash, 129 but a casino employee told
Ratzlaf that such a payment would trigger the cash reporting re-
quirements. 130 A casino limousine took Ratzlaf to various local
banks where he purchased cashier's checks under $10,000,
which, in turn, were given to the casino. 131 Ratzlaf, his wife, and
the casino employee were all charged with willful structuring. 132
The trial court charged the jury that the government had to
prove that Ratzlaf had knowledge of the reporting requirement
and purposefully attempted to evade that requirement. 133
Ratzlaf argued that an element of the offense was that he must
also know that structuring a transaction was illegal, an issue
upon which the Circuit Courts of Appeals had split.134
The leading decision had been United States v. Scanio,135 in
which the Court of Appeals had rejected the notion that knowl-
edge of illegality was an element of the crime. 136 The court in
Scanio distinguished this statute from prior statutes on currency
reporting when transporting money which had required knowl-
edge of illegality. 137 The court noted that the structuring crime
was not an evasion of "an obscure reporting requirement,"'138 and
held that enough evil was proven when the defendant knew of
the reporting requirement and evaded it.139 Moreover, the plain
language of the statute was clear.140
In United States v. Aversa,14 1 which consolidated several




132 See Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 137 n.2.
133 See id. at 137-38.
134 See id. at 138.
135 900 F.2d 485, 489 (2d Cir. 1990).
136 See id. at 489.
137 See id. at 489-92.; see also United States v. Mancuso, 420 F.2d 556, 559 (2d Cir.
1970) (explaining that when defendant has no knowledge.of law's provisions then no use-
ful purpose is served by prosecuting violators).
138 Scanio, 900 F.2d at 490.
139 See id.
140 See id. at 489. If simply limiting Cheek to tax cases was insufficient rationale,
courts noted that the currency reporting requirement and concomitant structuring viola-
tion did not have the requisite complexity "which often makes it difficult for the average
citizen to know what the law requires." Id.; see also United States v. Rogers, 962 F.2d
342, 344 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting complexity of law not present in "straightforward cur-
rency reporting requirements" therefore eliminating exception to liability).
141 984 F.2d 493 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding "willful" encompasses "knowingly" and
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cases, the First Circuit had a different interpretation of the word
"willfully". The court construed "willfully" in the structuring
statute to require some measure of proof of knowledge of illegal-
ity. 1 42 In one scenario, Donovan, president of a financial concern,
deposited funds from a friend to be used for investment in a
housing development. 143 No reports were filed and Donovan said
he thought these deposits were exempted from the reporting re-
quirements. 144 Another situation involved a man named Aversa,
who with the help of friend, sought to avoid the reporting re-
quirements by making several deposits under the reporting
limit.1 45 They did this to prevent Aversa's wife from discovering
his money. 146 They claimed they knew of the reporting require-
ments but did not know that structuring was illegal. 147
The court in Aversa concluded that "willful" has many mean-
ings and in this context it must mean more than intentional be-
cause the statute would have been read that way had "willful"
not been included.148 The court further concluded, however, that
a complete Cheek-like reading of "willfully" is too broad because
it. would provide a defense for even unreasonable mistakes of
law. 14 9 The court also noted that "willfully" must mean proof of a
violation of a "known legal duty or the reckless disregard of the
same." 150 Further, it must have the same meaning in all related
currency crimes, that one may be found guilty if one knows "the
law's requirements in a general sense, but recklessly or inten-
tionally fails to investigate the legality of ... proscribed activ-
ity."151
It should be noted that Aversa rejects the notion that its inter-
pretation is driven by the decision in Cheek.152 Donovan's convic-
tion was affirmed because he had been convicted under instruc-
"recklessly").
142 See United States v. Daniel F. Aversa, 984 F.2d 493, 498 (lst Cir. 1993) (requir-
ing that government prove "violation of a known legal duty or the reckless disregard of
the same").
143 See id. at 494.
144 See id.
145 See id. at 495.
146 See id.
147 See Aversa, 984 F.2d at 495.
148 See id. at 497, n.6.
149 See id. at 497.
150 Id. at 498.
151 Id. at 499.
152 See Aversa, 984 F.2d at 500-0 1.
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tions that required a higher level of evil, that willfulness was
"bad purpose" to disobey the law. 153 Aversa's guilty plea was
permitted to be withdrawn because the trial court had charged
the jury that knowledge of the illegality of structuring was not
an element of the defense. 154
Chief Judge Breyer's concurrence in Aversa is worthy to
note. 155 He joined the hybrid view of the principal opinion and
would have decided differently, but for the weight of other cir-
cuits which had concluded that the Cheek decision had no place
in currency regulation. 156
Both sets of laws are technical; ... sometimes criminalize
conduct that would not strike an ordinary citizen as immoral
or likely unlawful. Thus, both sets of laws may lead to un-
fair results of criminally prosecuting individuals who subjec-
tively and honestly believe they have not acted criminally. 157
Chief Judge Breyer appears to agree with Justice Torruella
who noted that, "[t]he legal duty at issue here ... does not even
approximate the general knowledge of the duty of taxpayers to
file an income tax return."158
This debate came to an end with the Supreme Court's five to
four opinion in Ratzlaf.159 It is Justice Ginsburg's opinion that
"willful" carries a Cheek meaning and is based on the structure
153 See id. at 501-02.
154 See id.
155 See id. at 502-03 (Breyer, C.J., concurring).
156 See id.
157 Aversa, 984 F.2d at 502.
158 Id. at 507 (Torruella, J., dissenting). See United States v. Speer, 824 F. Supp.
111, 112 (W.D. Ky. 1993). In United States v. Speer, Billy Logan Speer moved money in
$9000 increments from six different banks in three different cities, but no evidence, how-
ever, was adduced as to why he structured the transactions, no drugs, no tax evasion, no
prying soon-to-be-ex-wife. Id. The trial court adopted the rule of Aversa yet refused to
instruct the jury that reckless disregard of the law was also culpable. Id. at 112 n.2, 115.
The court noted that it is not "even a reasonable possibility that an average citizen" could
know of the structuring crime. Id. at 114. In a remarkable example of different rules for
different defendants, the "reckless" instruction seemed to be appropriate in Western
Kentucky when applied to:
[s]ophisticated tax dodgers, drug dealers and other trained professionals [who] may
well understand the inherent criminality of arranging transactions ... To apply this
law to this class of persons.., is imminently fair [sic] .... The same cannot be said
for the application of the statute to ordinary citizens.
Id. at 115.
159 See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 137 (1994) (holding that to sustain
conviction for willful violation of antistructuring law, government must prove that defen-
dant acted with knowledge that his conduct was illegal).
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of the statute itself. 160 Structuring was forbidden by § 5313, but
only criminalized if done willfully under § 5322.161 When the
statute is so read, the maxim becomes an irrelevant incantation
and is subsidiary to the myth of rationality. However, willful-
ness is interpreted this way by the Court to ensure that the de-
fendant acted with an evil motive since "currency structuring is
not inevitably nefarious."'162 Justice Ginsburg refused to consider
legislative musings because "we do not resort to legislative his-
tory to cloud a statutory text that is clear."163 Lastly, Justice
Ginsburg noted that the rule of lenity, that crimes construed in
the face of ambiguity are in the criminal's favor, would require
this resolution. 164 Nonetheless, there is no middle ground here;
for Ratzlaf to be convicted, it must be proven he knew that what
he did was illegal. 165
The dissenters intoned that ignorance of the law is no ex-
cuse. 166 Justice Blackmun reviewed the majority's decision
which held that proof of knowledge of the reporting require-
ment is a predicate to conviction. 167 Justice Blackmun disagreed
that the conduct was not nefarious. 168 After all "an individual
convicted of structuring is, by definition, aware that cash trans-
actions are regulated and he cannot seriously argue that he
lacked notice of the law's intrusion into the particular sphere of
activity."'169 Justice Blackmun argued that there is no complexity
here, requiring a Cheek-like approach. 170 Further, the standard
argument made by the dissenters in cases where knowledge of
160 See id. at 146-49 (noting that Congress criminalized only willful violation of stat-
ute, thus proof of defendant's knowledge of his duty not to avoid transactions that trigger
reporting, under the statute, is required for conviction).
161 31 U.S.C. § § 5313 (a) (1998) (delineating reporting requirements for certain cur-
rency transactions); 5322 (a) (1998) (outlining potential fines and prison terms for struc-
turing).
162 Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 144.
163 See id. at 147-48.
164 See id. at 147-49.; see also Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178 (1958)
(stating "This policy of lenity means that the Court will not interpret a federal criminal
statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an inter-
pretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what Congress intended").
165 See Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 147.
166 See id. at 150 -52 (Blackmun, Thomas, O'Connor, JJ., Rehnquist, C.J., dissent-
ing).
167 See id. at 150-57.
168 See id. at 154.
169 See id. at 155.
170 See Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 156.
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illegality is made an element of crime, is that the legislature's
purpose will be frustrated by the elevated proof requirement,
thereby making prosecution more difficult. 17 1
Congress when reading Ratzlaf was apparently shocked to
learn what the Court had said that Congress had written. 172
The Money Laundering Suppression Act of 1994173 restructured
the statute, codified in 31 U.S.C. § 5324, to follow the Scanio
approach. 174 The committee report displays some petulance:
"This amendment restores the clear Congressional intent that a
defendant need only have the intent to evade the reporting re-
quirement as the sufficient mens rea for the offense." 175 This cor-
rection of the Court has in no way dampened enthusiasm for
anti-maxim interpretations or, indeed, the use of Ratzlaf itself as
precedent.
Ratzlaf, despite fear of complexity and a reference to the rule
of lenity, is essentially a grammarian's decision. The two max-
ims of statutory interpretation clash, that the legislature is ra-
tional and that ignorance of law is not an excuse. Assuming
legislative rationality, the Court concluded "willfully" must mean
something more than the common rule of simple purpose when
the statute has multiple mental state descriptions. 176 In Aversa,
the court suggested that a Cheek-like interpretation of willfully
in a criminal tax statute is appropriate because the statute,
without any explicit mens rea, would nonetheless be interpreted
to have some. 177 One could respond that Congress was simply
supplying the mens rea, rather than allowing judicial wisdom to
infer one. The latest in the line of cases about what criminal
171 See id. at 161-62.
172 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-652, at 439 (1994); H.R. REP. NO. 103-438, at 57
(1994).
173 MONEY LAUNDERING SUPPRESSION ACT of 1994, PUB. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat.
2160. (Codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1998)).
174 See United States v. Scanio, 900 F.2d 485, 491 (2nd Cir. 1990) (holding that
criminal violation of § 5234 (3) may be established without proof of defendant's knowl-
edge that structuring is unlawful); see also Joshua Glotzer, Note, Ratzlaf Busts: Money
Laundering Suppression Act of 1994 Overrules Ratzlaf v. United States, 31 CAL. W. L.
REV. 141, 162-63 (1994) (discussing that due process concerns might still make knowl-
edge of illegality element of crime); Rachael Simonoff, Ratzlaf v. United States: The
Meaning of "Willful" and Demands of Due Process, 28 COLUM J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 397, 399
(1995) (arguing that Supreme Court's interpretation in Ratzlaf is consistent and proper
in view of notice and lenity requirements of due process).
175 H.R. REP. No. 103-438, at 57.
176 See Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 136-37.
177 See United States v. Aversa, 984 F.2d 493, 500 (1st Cir. 1993).
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statutes must mean if a mental element word is not included is
Staples v. United States.178
In Staples, Harold Staples was convicted for the unlawful pos-
session of an unregistered machine gun.179 The criminal statute
did not contain an explicit mens rea.180 Staples owned an AR-15
assault rifle which is manufactured to prevent it from being an
automatic weapon, that is, one that will fire continuously when
the trigger is pulled. 181 Staple's gun, however, had been modified
to avoid these safeties, and when the trigger was pulled, the rifle
fired repeatedly. 182 Staples pled moral innocence, that his rifle
had never fired automatically, only semi-automatically. 183  He
argued that since he was ignorant of the fact that his gun was an
automatic, he could not be convicted of violating 26 U.S.C. §
5861(d). 184 The district court disagreed and instructed the jury
that the government need not prove Staples knew each detail of
his weapon; "[iut would be enough to prove he knows he is deal-
ing with a dangerous device of a type as would alert one to the
likelihood of regulation."185
The majority opinion written by Justice Thomas takes the
well-trod path to find mens rea. Simply invoking the ordinary
common law presumption that crimes have some mens rea leads
the Court to the conclusion that some evilness of purpose is re-
quired. 186 The government, at first, argued that the statute was
designed to be one which lacked mens rea, that it is a regulatory
or public welfare offense which "do not require the defendant to
know the facts that make his conduct illegal."'187
178 511 U.S. 600 (1994).
179 See id. at 614 (conviction under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d)).
180 See 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (1994) provides:
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person... to receive or possess a firearm which is not
registered to him in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record...
Id.
181 See Staples, 511 U.S. at 614.
182 See id. at 614-15.
183 See id. at 615.
184 See id.
185 See id. at 615.
186 See Staples, 511 U.S. at 625; see also United States v. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422,
438 (1978) (acknowledging requirement of mens rea as predicate to liability as fundamen.
tal precept of American common law); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951)
(noting importance of existence of mens rea to principles of criminal jurisprudence);
Women's Medical Profession Corp. v. Voinouich, 911 F.Supp 1051, 1082 (S.D. Ohio 1995)
(asserting courts adherence to principle that wrongdoing must be conscious to be evil).
187 Staples, 511 U.S. at 616.
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The problem with strict liability offenses is the requirement of
due process, 188 that one should know that he is in a situation
where there is, according to Justice Thomas, "a probability of
strict regulation."'189 This due process requirement is not subjec-
tive knowledge of illegality, but rather objective knowledge of the
possibility of regulation. 190 A mid-ground is available here. The
government should be required to prove that subjectively, the de-
fendant knew or should have known, he was dealing with "some
dangerous or deleterious substance." 19 1 The concern was that a
statute cannot be a public welfare offense, dispensing with mens
rea altogether, when such a reading would result in a statute
which would "criminalize a number of apparently innocent
acts." 192
This concern framed what is essentially a political question: Is
the ownership of guns such a dangerous condition that would
allow the dispensation of mens rea? Justice Thomas concluded
that while dangerous, gun possession is so "commonplace" that it
does not alert individuals to the likelihood of regulation. 193 Fur-
188 See United States v. Garrett, 984 F.2d 1402, 1411 (5th Cir. 1993) (acknowledging
due process problem inherent in strict liability offenses); Levas & Levas v. Village of An-
lioch, Ill., 684 F.2d 446, 455 (7th Cir. 1982) (noting possibility of due process violation in
strict liability offenses).
189 Staples, 511 U.S. at 617.
190 See United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565
(1971) (noting that "[W]here... dangerous or deleterious devices or products or obnox-
ious waste materials are involved, the probability of regulation is great that anyone who
is aware that he is in possession of them ... must be presumed to be aware of the regula-
tion"); see also Susan L. Pilcher, Ignorance, Discretion and the Fairness of Notice: Con-
fronting "Apparent Innocence in the Criminal Law", 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 25 (1995)
(discussing varying opinions of Staples decision and purpose of Congress' requirements).
See generally Stephen Satzburg, Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases: Harmonizing
the Views of the Justices, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 393, 414-46 (1983) (noting various inter-
pretations of "knowledge" in criminal jurisprudence).
191 See United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. at 617 n.3.
Justice Thomas used "dangerous or deleterious substances" as a characterization of the
prior strict liability cases to, in a sense, limit their further application. Id. Looking at
crimes in currency or tax, clearly the item itself (large sums of income) is not dangerous,
but it is difficult to say that a citizen would not be on notice that the transaction or item
(currency or income) is not subject to governmental regulation. Id.; see also Pilcher, su-
pra note 189, at 22. Awareness is necessary to justify holding an individual responsible
for violation of a public welfare statute. Id.
192 See United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. at 618
(quoting Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985)); see also United States v.
Lizarraga-Lizarraga, 541 F.2d 826, 828 (9th Cir. 1976) (stating that violation of 22 U.S.C.
§ 1934, "willful" attempt at export of ammunition into Mexico required proof of actual
knowledge of illegality because list of restricted exports included items not generally
known to be regulated).
193 See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619-20 (1994) (rationalizing if Con-
gress had intended to make outlaws of gun owners who were wholly ignorant of offending
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ther, he asserted there is an "overlay of legal restriction on gun
ownership, we question whether regulations on guns are suffi-
ciently intrusive that they impinge on the common experience
that owning a gun is usually licit and blameless conduct."194
Additionally, Justice Thomas noted the traditional view 195
that the possibility of harsh terms of imprisonment under this
act impels a mens rea requirement of actual knowledge of the
automatic character of the item possessed. 196 In fact, he offered
this bit of dicta: "[wie should not apply the public welfare offense
rationale to interpret any statute defining a felony offense." 197
Justice Thomas also offered the rule of lenity as an additional
explanation. 19 8
Upon reversal, Justice Ginsburg argued that the mental ele-
ment inferred is simply factual knowledge, that the actor must
have knowingly possessed "a weapon with all the characteristics
that subject it to registration, but was unaware of the registra-
tion requirement, or thought the gun was registered.... "199
The dissenters argued that guns are not sufficiently dangerous
to provide a basis for a public welfare offense even under Justice
Thomas' description of these crimes.200 They quarreled with the
notion that an elevated penalty suggests an elevated mens
rea,201 and point out that in United States v. Balint,202 a classic
characteristics of their weapons, it would have spoken more clearly); see also Ostrosky v.
State, 704 P.2d 786, 789 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (noting that after reviewing unlicensed
fishing prosecution, court concluded mistake of law defense is appropriate, but that such
mistake must be reasonable).
194 Staples, 511 U.S. at 621.
195 See generally A.F. Brooke II, When Ignorance of the Low Became an Excuse:
Lambert and It's Progeny, 19 AM. J. CRIM. L. 279, 285-87 (1992) (discussing history and
future of mens rea requirement in criminal jurisprudence).
196 See Staples, 511 U.S. at 622-24 (noting importance of mens rea when significant
criminal liability is imposed).
197 Id. at 624 (commenting that rule of leniency is additional reason why public wel-
fare offense rationale should not be used in interpretation of criminal statutes).
198 See id. at 625 n.17.
199 Id. at 627 n.3 (Ginsburg, and O'Connor, JJ., concurring in judgment).
200 See Staples, 511 U.S. at 628-38 (Stevens, and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting); see also
Chapman, supra note 91, at 1136 (stating requirements of Staples regulated item to be
deleterious devise/product and that one would not be surprised to learn it regulated to
adequately be classified as public welfare offense).
201 See Scott E. Sundby, The Reasonable Doubt Rule and the Meaning of Innocence,
40 HASTINGS L.J. 457, 477 (1989) (recognizing importance of mens rea requirement in
defining culpability); see also Kepten D. Carmichael, Strict Criminal Liability for Envi-
ronmental Violations: A Need for Judicial Restraint, 71 IND. L.J. 729, 742 (1996) (ac-
knowledging courts' hesitation to convict defendants without proof of adequate mens rea
when penalties involve substantial imprisonment); Dean J. Spader, Mega Trends in
Criminal Justice Theory, 13 AM. J. CRIM. L. 157, 167 (1986) (discussing importance of
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regulatory offense case, the penalty was five years. 20 3 Given the
majority's conclusions, one wonders how Congress can write a
strict liability offense because a statute purposely bereft of a
mental state will have one added at a level higher than that re-
quired for an ordinary crime. It appears as if the Court will not
resort to legislative history absent ambiguity, and even the word
"willfully" is not sufficiently ambiguous by evidence of Staples or
Ratzlaf. Perhaps legislatures should write in the statute that it
is a strict liability offense which enables the courts to review the
propriety of the stricture for constitutional limitations, such as
vagueness or due process.
The dissenters also gave an extended analysis of the concern of
"avoid[ing] punishing people for apparently 'innocent activ-
ity'. . ."204 The Court concluded that proof of knowledge that an
individual knowingly had a dangerous device was insufficient
protection. 205 Justice Stevens described innocent activity as that
which is "without any consciousness of wrongdoing, ' 20 6 albeit
without evil purpose, or knowledge of illegality.207 Given that
tautology, the Court's description of the offense does not protect
the truly innocent.
In crimes dealing with firearms, the use of the maxim, igno-
rance of the law is no excuse, is dying out. Title 18 U.S.C. § 922
(a) (1) (A) makes it unlawful to deal in firearms without a li-
cense. 208 The crime's penalty provision is found in 18 U.S.C. §
924(a)(1) which provides a $5000 fine or five years in jail for: "(A)
knowingly [making] false statement under this chapter...; (B)
mens rea in sentencing).
202 117 S. Ct. 47 (1996).
203 See Staples, 511 U.S. at 628-38 (noting classic regulatory offense did not require
establishment of specific elevated mens rea (citing United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250
(1922))).
204 Staples, 510 U.S. at 636.
205 See id. (citing Ginsburg, J.) (noting lack of intent to add knowledge requirement
to possession of weapon).
206 See id.
207 See id.
208 See 18 U.S.C. § 922 (a) (1) (A) (1994). The statute provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful-
(1) for any person-
(A) except a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, or licensed dealer to en-
gage in the business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms, or in
the course of such business to ship, transport, or receive any firearm in inter-
state or foreign commerce;..
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knowingly [violating a number of subsections of § 922]; ... or (D)
willfully violates any other provision of this chapter."209
In a steady stream of Congressional ineptitude, subsection D
was added to our gun control legislation by the Firearms Own-
ers' Protection Act.210 Prior to subsection D, Congress thought
that the lack of a specific mens rea requirement under the Gun
Control Act of 1968 could result "in severe penalties for uninten-
tional missteps. '2 11 However, nowhere in the legislative history
was there any acknowledgment that lack of knowledge of ille-
gality as an element of the crime was a problem.
In United States v. Obiechie,2 12 Obiechie bought numerous
Berettas in Illinois and smuggled them into Nigeria for a hefty
profit.2 13 He was convicted by the district court of willfully
dealing in arms without a license. The court concluded that the
statute proscribed simply intentional conduct, and did not in-
clude actions with knowledge of illegality. 214
After reviewing prior decisions 215 and legislative history, the
209 18 U.S.C. § 922 (a) (1) (a) (emphasis added).
210 See FIREARMS OWNER'S PROTECTION ACT, PUB. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (codi-
fied as amended at 18 U.S.C. § § 922-926, 929, and 26 I.R.C. 5845 (1994)).
211 Obiechie, 38 F.3d at 312 (quoting United States v. Collins, 957 F.2d 72, 74-76 (2d
Cir. 1992); see also Pilcher, supra note 190, at 25 (noting problems of mens rea in "inno-
cent" firearm possession").
212 38 F.3d 309 (7th Cir. 1994).
213 See id. at 310.
214 See id. at 310-12 (noting district court's decision to convict defendant primarily
because of defendant's intent to commit criminal act).
215 See United States v. Collins, 957 F.2d 72, 73 (2d Cir. 1992). The court reviewed
the conviction of the affable Mr. Collins who had made several gun sales to BATF agents
in spite of his lack of a license to do so. Id. He removed the serial numbers from the guns
and made sure it did not have his fingerprints. Id. The district court refused to charge
the jury about the definition of the word willfully. Id. at 74. Collins pointed to a House
report which criticized the Senate bill which was eventually passed. Id. The criticism was
that "willfully" meant prosecutors would have to prove actual knowledge of illegality. Id.
at 75. The Court of Appeals, however, noted that floor colloquies infer that the word's
purpose was simply to avoid strict liability treatment and reread the House report to
conclude willfully should be read as simply a "knowing and purposeful" act. Id. at 76;
United States v. Hern, 926 F.2d 764, 764-67 (8th Cir. 1991). In United States v. Hern,
the government agreed with Hern that proof of knowledge of illegality was part of the
crime. Id. The court agreed with the consensus that proof of knowledge of illegality is
part of the crime by stating that the legislative history was "consistent with that ap-
proach." Id. at 767 n.6; see also United States v. Palmiere, 21 F.3d 1265, 1267-70 (3d Cir.
1994). In United States v. Palmiere, the court affirmed the conviction of an unlicensed
gun dealer. Id. The district court had instructed the jury that knowledge of illegality
need not be proven and that the actor need only be found to have acted voluntarily. Id. at
1270 n.4. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals noted that: "[tihis instruction alone would
have been insufficient to convey the requirement of willfulness..." Id. See generally
United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 613 (4th Cir. 1995). The court noted that the leg-
islative history of the FOPA amendments demonstrate "that 'willfully' was intended to
mean undertaken in violation of a known legal duty .... Id. After Ratzlaf and Obiechie,
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court of appeals concluded that they were unable to ascertain
Congress' intent. 216 The court of appeals adopted Ratzlaf's view
that willful can be interpreted without resorting to legislative
history "through a review of its context... mindful of the com-
plex provisions in which they are embedded." 217 Section 924 of
the statue has four subsections, three of these subsections con-
tain "knowingly" as the mens rea and only one includes the word
"willfully. '2 18 Therefore, willfully must mean something different
than knowingly. This result is also based on the traditional as-
sumption that Congress knows what it is willfully doing. 219
However, what does knowingly mean? As the court of appeals
noted, the prosecution must dither in response because there is
no difference. 220 The government argued that 'willfully' may re-
quire actual knowledge of the facts constituting the offense,
whereas 'knowingly' would also include the 'ostrich' defendant
who... consciously avoids those facts."22 1 Citing Cheek, the
court of appeals concluded that the only difference is a subjective
knowledge of illegality, which must be proven in order to convict
Obiechie. 222
The decline in the usefulness of the maxim, in relation to
automatic weapons, is the product of several forces. There is the
specious devotion to plain meaning, grammar, or statutory struc-
the Court of Appeals again considered prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 924 (a) (1) (D)
(1994), for buying a gun while under an information. Id.; United States v. Hayden, 64
F.3d 126, 127 (3d Cir. 1995). The court held that Ratzlaf did not apply with its structural
analysis but rather that the legislative history proved Congress' intent to have an anti-
maxim interpretation. Id. at 130. Hayden's conviction was reversed because the trial
court improperly refused evidence as to his low intelligence and reading level, evidence
which was relevant to prove his lack of capacity to know the law. Id. at 133.
216 See Obiechie, 38 F.3d at 312-13 (noting courts differing conclusions reading same
legislative history, therefore, implying Congress' ambiguous intentions).
217 Id. at 313 (quoting United States v. Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. 135, 141 (1994) (quoting
Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497 (1943))).
218 See 18 U.S.C. § 924 (1994).
219 See William N. Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 681 (1990)
(acknowledging traditional assumption that Congress knows canon of construction along
with judicial interpretation of prior law and, therefore, knows what it is doing).
220 See Obiechie, 38 F.3d at 314-16; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(8) (1985) (de-
fining willfully as knowingly).
221 Obiechie, 38 F.3d at 314-16. See Robin Charlow, Willful Ignorance and Criminal
Culpability, 70 TEx. L. REV. 1351, 1382-84 (1992) (setting forth reasons willful ignorance
delineates state of mind between knowledge and recklessness).
222 See Obiechie, 38 F.3d at 314-16 (stating that knowledge of illegality be proven
before determining criminal culpability); see also United States v. Young, 875 F. Supp.
350, 351 (W.D. Va. 1995) (finding that defendant intended violation of known legal duty
necessary to satisfy "willful" element of offense).
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ture coupled with apparent legislative carelessness. Simply,
Congress did not mean anything by switching mental state ad-
verbs in the gun statutes. "Knowingly" and "willfully" fre-
quently, and logically, can mean the same thing.223
Part of this interpretation by courts could be reduced if there
was true precision by the drafters. Perhaps, as the Twentieth
Century closes, drafters will recognize the adverbial inconsis-
tency and more directly draw the mental state they mean. Fur-
ther, courts should consider that when interpreting statutes,
sometimes the legislature is purposeful in its ambiguity.
Gun legislation presents an example of the political conflict
which might provide purposeful legislative ambiguity, an ambi-
guity which wrecks any maxim of interpretation. Courts have
disregarded the maxim in cases where the crimes were theoreti-
cally arcane or surprising. The courts' fears reflect and feed on
the public perception of unfair governmental intrusion. Conse-
quently, in the pro-gun lobby, one is likely to find hostility to the
maxim that ignorance of law is no excuse. 224
Congressional leaders writing gun control legislation are
aware of this view. However, in a diverse body politic, gun con-
trol is frequently thought of as a good idea. Why not require
crimes which involve guns to have been committed "willfully"?
The advocates of control will read the word as simple purpose,
while those opposed to control will find the protection of proof of
knowledge of illegality. As a result, the usefulness of the maxim
is slowly destroyed.225
223 See Michael L. Travers, Mistake of Law In Mala Prohibita Crimes, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1301, 1323 (1995) (noting criminal statutes define "willfully" to mean "done know-
ingly").
224 See 131 CONG. REC. S9101-5 (daily ed. July 9, 1985). In the debates on the Fed-
eral Firearms Owners Protection Act, Cong. Wallop had David T. Hardy's Article from
January 1980, entitled Gun Laws and Gun Collector placed in the record. That submis-
sion ends with the thumping paragraph:
I think this legislation is badly needed ... to force the enforcing agency back toward
real criminals and away from law- abiding gun owners... I am tired... of having
citizens without criminal intent being charged with felonies, tired of having honest
collectors' museum-grade firearms seized as if they were likely to be used in a crime,
tired of agents who withhold firearms after their owners have been acquitted of all
charges, tired of hearing that ignorance of the law is no excuse,' when the law is so
vague the directors of the enforcing agencies admit ignorance of its provisions.
Id.
225 See e.g., United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533, 533 (2d Cir. 1995). The court re-
viewed a Clean Water Act crime. Id. In the confusingly written crime, the defendant
sought to have the mens rea word knowingly described as actual knowledge of illegality.
Id. at 537. The court rejected Staples as a guide, concluding that this crime was a public
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Fear of invasive government, unexpected regulation of licit
conduct, bad drafting and concerns of knowledge of legality were
involved in the exploration of the minimum necessary scienter
requirements in United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc. 22 6 The
defendant company was caught selling pornographic films. 2 2 7
Undercover investigations discovered that the actress was under
eighteen and the marketers were indicted under the Protection
of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977.228 The
question arose as to whether "knowingly" in the statute's provi-
sions means: intentionally transports something that is child
pornography, even without knowing it; intentionally transports
pornography knowing it is pornography, but unaware that it is
child pornography; or intentionally transporting pornography
knowing it is child pornography. 229 The court of appeals re-
viewed the statute and reversed the convictions because the
welfare offense. Id. As additional support, the court noted that Congress had removed
willfully, supplanting the word with knowingly. Id. at 539. In the legislative history of
this change, Congress intimated simply its intent to strengthen the crimes. Id. The court
reviewing Cheek, Ratzlaf and Murdock could then say (as the maxim is dying): "One way
of heightening criminal sanctions is to reduce the mens rea element of the prohibited
acts, and a change from prohibiting 'willful' acts to prohibiting 'knowing' acts may be
viewed such a reduction." Id. at 539.
226 513 U.S. 64, 77-79 (1994) (setting forth scienter requirement to be satisfied before
criminal culpability can be determined).
227 See id. at 66.
228 See id. at 66; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1988). The statute provides in part:
(a) Any person who-
(1) Knowingly transports or ships in interstate or foreign commerce by any means
including by computer or mails, any visual depiction, if-
(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging
in sexually explicit conduct; and
(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct;
(2) Knowingly receives, or distributes, any visual depiction that has been mailed,
or has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, or which
contains materials which have been mailed or so shipped or transported by any
means including by computer, or knowingly reproduces any visual depiction for
distribution in interstate or foreign commerce or through the mails, if-
(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging
in sexually explicit conduct; and
(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct;
Shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
Id.
229 See X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 68-69.
It would seem odd, to say the least, that Congress distinguished between someone
who inadvertently dropped an item into the mail without realizing it, and someone
who consciously placed the same item in the mail, but was nonetheless unconcerned
about whether the person had any knowledge of the prohibited contents of the pack-
age.
Id.
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statute did not require proof of knowledge of the minority of the
child and, consequently, the crime was facially unconstitu-
tional. 230 The Supreme Court reversed and concluded that the
statute should be read to include a requirement of such knowl-
edge. 231
Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized the problem of simply
parsing the statute. 232 The word "knowingly" is far distant from
the clause concerning minors, blocked by comma, dash and the
habitual statutory paragraphic overgrowth. 233 Consequently,
under "the most grammatical reading" all one needed to do was
knowingly distribute, knowledge of content was immaterial. 234
Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded this reading resulted in an
absurdity, that Congress could not have intended to criminalize
the mere mailing of a package if the actor did not know anything
about its contents. 235 In this situation, maxim confronts maxim.
Plain meaning should be rendered, but laws cannot be absurd.
Perhaps resolution of this debate would have been sufficient to
resolve the case, but the Chief Justice moves on.
"Our reluctance to simply follow the most grammatical reading
of the statute is heightened by our cases interpreting criminal
statutes. The statutes allow us to include broadly applicable sci-
enter requirements, even where the statutes by its terms does
not contain them."236 For example, in Morissette v. United
States, the court concluded that 18 U.S.C. § 641 prohibits one
from "knowingly convert[ing] ... [a] thing of value of the United
States. '237  The Court acknowledged Staples as well.238 Ac-
cording to Chief Justice Rehnquist, these cases stand for the
230 See id. at 67.
231 See id. at 78-79.
232 See id. at 69-70.
233 See id. at 68.
234 See X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 70.
235 See id. at 69. Congress did not intend the express courier to be penalized for de-
livering a box in which the shipper had declared the contents to be "film" as knowingly
transporting the film. Id.
236 See id. at 70.
237 Id. (citing Morissette, 342 U.S. at 248, 248 n.2 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 641)). Compare
United States v. La Ports, 46 F.3d 152, 158 (2d Cir. 1994). The court, in applying 18
U.S.C. § 1361, concluded that the crime of willfully injuring property of the United
States, does not require in arson prosecution, knowledge that the property is the United
States. Id., with United States v. Bangert, 645 F.2d 1297, 1304 (8th Cir. 1981). Knowl-
edge that property is United States owned is required for conviction. Id.
238 See X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 71 (citing Staples v. United States, 511 U.S.
600 (1994)).
1999]
668 ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 13:635
proposition that "the presumption in favor of a scienter require-
ment should apply to each of the statutory elements which
criminalize otherwise innocent conduct."239  Chief Justice
Rehnquist rejected the notion that the offense described here is a
public welfare offense. 240 Rather than taking a middle ground,
that the actor simply know that he was dealing in pornography,
actual knowledge of child pornography is required. 241 If simple
knowledge of pornography were required, one might argue that if
a child is involved it could create a public welfare offense and be
subject to regulation. 242 Instead, this crime is not such an of-
fense because "[pleople do not harbor settled expectations that
the contents of magazines and film are generally subject to...
regulation."243 Here, as in Staples, the level of the penalty was
also seen as a reason for this elevated mental state.
Looking at the plain meaning of the statute leads to the con-
clusion that the statute was unconstitutional and, therefore, it
should be read in a manner that will save it from nullity. Chief
Justice Rehnquist reviewed the legislative history 244 and con-
cluded that "it can be summarized by saying that it persuasively
indicates that Congress intended the term 'knowingly' apply to
the requirement that the depiction be of sexually explicit con-
duct; it is a good deal less clear.., that Congress intended that
the requirement extend also to the age of the performers. 245
The Chief Justice then decided to read the statute more gram-
matically and concluded that if the adverb "knowingly" modifies
one element of a distant clause, it must modify the other.246
In his dissent, Justice Scalia railed against what he considered
to be rewriting, not close reading. 247 He said the language was
239 X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 72.
240 See id. at 71.
241 See United States v. Baytank (Houston), Inc., 934 F.2d 599, 607-08 (5th Cir.
1991) (noting different approach dealing with crimes for improper storage of hazardous
wastes, where for conviction, actor must know he had waste, but need not know regula-
tion); see also United States v. Laughlin, 768 F. Supp. 957, 962 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) (ruling
government is not required to prove defendants knowledge of violation of law).
242 See X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 73. Justice Rehnquist rejected this argument
noting that ". . .one would reasonably expect to be free from regulation when trafficking
in sexually explicit, though not obscene, materials involving adults." Id.
243 Id. at 71.
244 See id. at 73-78.
245 Id. at 77.
246 See id. at 77-78. Justice Stevens in his brief concurrence catches onto this ap-
proach. Id. at 79-80 (Stevens, J., concurring).
247 See X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 87-88. (Scalia, and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
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plain, that knowingly merely modified the verbs in the clause in
which it is contained. 248 "There is no doubt. There is no ambi-
guity. There is no possible 'less natural' but nonetheless permis-
sible reading."249  Justice Scalia disagreed with Justice
Rehnquist's analysis that mere knowledge that one deals in por-
nography is not enough to pass constitutional muster. 250 In Jus-
tice Scalia's view, the statute as written is unconstitutional. 251
Further, Justice Scalia believes that the conclusion does not
give the Court the right to save the statute by rewriting its
text. 252
Cheek did not establish a constitutional requirement, but sim-
ply interpreted "willfully" in federal income tax felonies, sug-
gesting that the interpretation of "willfully" was based on Con-
gressional intent because the underlying statute was complex.
Cheek does not say that complex crimes must have as an element
knowledge of illegality. Indeed, Cheek should not be applied to
crimes which do not contain the word "willfully".
Staples might suggest that in the absence of mens rea, the
courts' inclination must be to read in an evil mental state. X-
Citement Video confirms that scienter is the presumption when
the conduct criminalized seems innocent, and there is complete
subjective knowledge of possession of regulated material. It was
noted in Ratzlaf that the structure of the statute is most infor-
mative when Congress uses a multiplicity of mental state words.
If "willfully" is used for some items and "knowingly" or nothing is
used for others, "willfully" must mean something different and
something more. Even if knowledge of illegality becomes an
element, there is a range of views as to whether that knowledge
must be actual and subjective, as set forth in Cheek or one of
"reckless disregard" or "purposeful avoidance." The sheer weight
of these cases and approaches have diminished the effect of the
maxim.
State courts have been influenced by the decisions of these
248 See id. at 81-82 (stating that "the ninth circuit's integration is in fact, and quite
obviously, the only grammatical reading").
249 Id. at 82 (noting that scienter only applies to first clause).
250 See id. at 83-84.
251 See id. at 86.
252 See X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 85-87. "The conclusion of unconstitutionality is
of course no ground for going back to reinterpreting the statute, making it say something
that it does not say, but that is constitutional." Id.
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federal cases. In Iowa v. Azneer,253 the Supreme Court of Iowa
examined "willfully" in sanctions associated with the state's po-
litical contribution law. 254 Azneer made contributions, but was
reimbursed by his employer. Their behavior constituted the pro-
hibited act of making a contribution in the name of another. 255
The debate is the familiar one, does "willfully" in the penalty sec-
tion mean with knowledge of a legal duty or simply intention-
ally? "Willfully" is a word of many meanings and the court re-
sorted to an analysis grounded in the ancient mala in se, mala
prohibitum distinction.
This distinction in dividing evil is not substantively different
from the issue presented in Staples or X-Citement Video, that is,
when is conduct sufficiently dangerous or outside the contempla-
tion of ordinary individuals as licit or unregulated behavior.
Courts have repeatedly used the policy concerns raised by prin-
ciples of due process and vagueness as reasons to interpret
criminal statutes contrary to the maxim. The border between
the evil in itself and the government's definition of evil is not
clear. When conduct nears that border, the courts feel they have
license to interpret the crime in a fashion to protect the public,
which they consider innocent. While much can be said for this
laudatory objective, such an episodic technique does not provide
real notice to the drafter on how the crime should be described.
Can an act be prohibited so long and so publicly that it becomes
wrong in itself ? The classic elements of the mala prohibitum
are: the mores of the community or moral attitudes do not inform
that the conduct is forbidden; the offender is not socially danger-
ous; the offender reasonably thought the conduct was not crimi-
nal; and the conduct is not by nature immoral. 256
The sense of what is moral or the actual mores of the commu-
nity are not the subject of proof or explicit finding of the legisla-
ture, but is in the hands of the jurists. Further, an anti-maxim
interpretation insulates the deluded or the furtive, not just those
who reasonably thought the conduct was not criminal. Taken to
Cheek, these marks of distinction do not mesh with the result.
253 526 N.W.2d 298 (Iowa 1995).
254 See id. at 299.
255 See id.
256 See id. at 299-300 (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL
LAW414-15 (2d. ed. 1986).
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After all, fifty years of income tax prosecutions for failure to re-
port income from wages should have informed the community.
The court in Azneer concluded the crime was one of mere mala
prohibita and "willfully" in that political contribution law meant
"a voluntary and intentional violation of a known legal duty."257
It says:
Some stealth or surreptitiousness might be involved...
[b]ut we cannot say that to do so is malum in se... The
practice posed by the facts ... may well not engender admi-
ration. The legislature was obviously prompt to criminalize
them. But the practice posed falls far short of qualifying as
malum in se. 25 8
The crime as written is not vague if "willfully" meant that the
act was intentional. Due process would yet be served and the
use of "willfully" produces an opportunity for judicial intru-
sion. 259
As Justice Douglas suggested in Screws, perhaps a review of
all cases dealing with "willfully" in a criminal context would not
be profitable because they are so fact dependent. 260 In fact, such
a review would be impossible since the word is everywhere. Jus-
tice Douglas, even fifty years ago, could not have read all the
cases involving the word "willfully." However, all one needs to
do is watch over those cases which are the exception to the rule
that ignorance of law is no excuse, an interpretation produced
most easily, but not limited to, when "willfully" appears.
257 Id. at 300.
258 Azneer, 526 N.W.2d at 300.
259 See People v. Weiss, 479 N.W.2d 30, 31 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991). The court re-
viewed the dismissal of a misdemeanor charge under Michigan's Campaign Finance Act.
Id. Section 41(1), M.C.L. 169. 201 provided that "a person who knowingly violates" the
Act is guilty. Id. (quoting Campaign Finance Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 169.201 et seq.
(1991)). The prosecution was based upon Weiss' cash political contributions in excess of
$20.00. Id. at 32. The prosecution argued that all that need be proven is that "the defen-
dant knew that he was making a contribution of more than $20 in cash." Id. The defen-
dant argued that he had to know that a cash contribution was illegal. Id. The court con-
cluded that the statute was ambiguous, and that the construction proposed by the
defendant was "plausible." Id. at 33. The statute defines "contribution" as a transfer
"made for the purpose of influencing the nomination or election of a candidate." Id. (cit-
ing Campaign Finance Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 169.204 (1) (1991)). The court concluded
that a "contribution" must be made knowingly, that is knowing that its purpose is to in-
fluence. Id. at 33. Consequently, knowingly in the criminal provision must mean more,
namely knowledge of illegality. Id. at 33-34. The court, relying on Cheek, argued that
"complex regulatory statutes often modify the traditional rule." Id. at 34.
260 See generally Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 93 (1945) (ruling that due
process of law gives one right to be charged by jury and sentenced by court).
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The study of law in the modern age is compartmentalized,
even in the law of crime. Particularly, each area of federal and
state concerns, like taxation, produces its own supplementary
body of criminal law which is generally only explored by the
practitioners in that technical area. In crimes of selective serv-
ice 26 1, immigration 262, bankruptcy 263 and others, both before
and after Cheek, similar erosion in the effectiveness of the
maxim in interpreting criminal statutes has taken place. When
knowledge of illegality becomes an element of crime unconven-
tional issues arise, such as proof of law, confusion, presumptions
of knowledge or willful ignorance. These issues arise because
such a rule is contrary to the maxim. Useful precedents exist
outside of the subset of the law where related problems have
been more fully explored. As to whether ignorance of law is not
an excuse, one can find examples where ignorance of law is ex-
culpatory in many cubby holes of iniquity and rarely prosecuted
crimes.
In tax crimes the defense of ignorance of law could be replaced
fairly with a reasonable legal delusion defense and, perhaps, a
codified list of positions which are incapable of being reasonably
believed. In tax crimes, the imposition of criminal penalties nec-
essarily is preceded by an enormous series of administrative,
close up opportunities to resolve any legal question. Individuals
261 See Graves v. United States, 252 F.2d 878, 881 (9th Cir. 1958). Mr. Graves, a
beekeeper, was drafted and asked for a postponement because of the honey harvest. Id.
at 880. While a postponement was granted, the new date was also during harvest and he
did not receive notice which was sent to his mother's home. Id. He was occupied with re-
mote apiary concerns until the time had passed. Id. at 880-81. While recognizing the
statute carried some criminal intent requirement, the court held that the culpable intent
should be "bad purpose." Id. at 882 (quoting Heikkinen v United States, 355 U.S. 273
(1958)); see also Heikkinen v. United States, 335 U.S. 273, 274 (1958). Heikkinen inter-
preted an immigration statute which penalized willful conduct. Id. at 274. Nonetheless,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held the cases were similar enough to elevate the
mental state. Id. at 274-80.
262 See Heikkinen v. United States, 355 U.S. 273, 274 (1958). The Supreme Court
reviewed the conviction of an alien under an order to be deported for "willfully
fail[ing] ... to depart from the United States" and "willfully fail[ing]... to make timely
application in good faith for travel or other documents." Id. The Court concluded, out of
rarefied air, that the word required "evidence, or an inference permissible under the
statute, of a 'bad purpose' or '[nonjustifiable excuse', or the like .... Id. at 279.
263 See In Re Toti, 24 F.3d 806, 808 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting Cheek-like mental state
may not be required for discharge actions). See generally In Re Batie, 995 F.2d 85, 89-90
(6th Cir. 1993) (disallowing complete discharge of indebtedness by equating recklessness
with intent); Collins v. United States, 848 F.2d 740, 742 (6th Cir. 1988) (stating that one
is responsible for willful failure to pay taxes if deliberate choice is made to voluntarily,
consciously and intentionally pay other creditors rather than taxes).
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who claim lack of knowledge of illegality when charged with a
tax crime, either have purposely avoided competent counsel or
have ignored their constant losses in civil process. Anyone who
believes wages are not subject to the income tax ought to be
subject, in turn, to being locked up in one institution or the
other.
Tax crimes so structured could inspire individuals to learn the
law, the incentive of the old maxim, and it would not create so-
cial injustice. Nonetheless, the line of cases from the Supreme
Court and others, from the first tax crimes cases outward, worry
about the twists of this tangled law trapping the common tax-
payer. If old tax law is still thought to be incomprehensible,
then modern crimes, set in complicated statutes as part of the
now common scheme to put a cap on compliance of some new
regulatory device designed for areas where the opportunity for
civil litigation, administrative determination or permanent pro-
nouncements of legal disputes are frequently reduced, must be
found unknowable.
Even if the crime is vague, the court, believing or mouthing in
the myth of legislative omnipotence and competence, is inclined
to read the legislative criminal endeavor so as not to be un-
knowable or offend due process in any way. Thus, when finding
that ignorance of law as a defense is plausible because of the
truly hidden nature of the crime or from the legislature's delib-
eration or from the text itself, the courts will do so. The only
crimes which there will be debate about are new crimes which
deal with guns, sex, money, money laundering, automatic weap-
ons, and video pornography.
The maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse cannot pre-
vail. As an interpretative device, it has been reduced to a start-
ing point, at best, a faint predilection, almost to remind us of
how criminal laws used to be. Over time, the maxim will not
have vitality in newly decided cases. The maxim is trumped by
any canon of new rigorous construction, the pressures of due
process or even, the last resort, the medieval rule of lenity. The
rule of lenity, itself, is a device so weak, only reached by the hon-
est interpreter if the statute were ambiguous, a rule which pre-
viously lost to the old maxim. After all, how could a statute be
ambiguous with respect to knowledge of illegality because igno-
rance of the law is no excuse?
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Full recognition of the death of the maxim might be useful. At
least, climax might stimulate a legislative awareness that there
is a choice which can be made. Unless the crime is carefully
written, there exists a good chance that courts or juries may
grant freedom to individuals who ordinarily would not deserve it.
Perhaps we would wish not to label as felons the timorous Spies,
the innkeeper Barney, the Philadelphia policeman Hart, and the
process server Harvey. However, what about the tax cheat
Cheek, the murderous Screws, the over armed Staples, the
death-dealing Obiechie or the smut merchants of X-Citement
Video, Inc.? Should they be let go in answer to their new plea
that, at root, they did not know what they did was wrong?
